The law of North Dakota regarding attorney fees is rather common in the various states.  So let us take a look at it to get some of the doctrines that chances are will be discussed in the cases in your jurisdiction.  Well before federal courts started discussing "lodestar" amounts and formulating doctrines of law, the state courts, like North Dokota, judicially noted the elements that go into determining a reasonable fee.  City of Bismarck v. Thom (ND, 1977) was typical.  It stated  that the base for determining a reasonable fee is found by multiplying the number of hours expended by each attorney by the hourly rate normally charged for similar work by attorneys of like skill in the area.  The court noted that it was for similar work by attorneys of like skill,  which is not necessarily the same as the average hourly rate of all attorneys in the area.  When this base rate is established than other less objective factors are introduced to determine a reasonable fee.

Estate of Hass, 2002 ND 82 awarded attorney fees against the estate of a decedent for legal services included by an objector in a will contest because the proceedings benefited the estate as a whole.   This cases well discusses the theory involved.  It is a reminder to attorneys that attorney fees may be awarded in times when attorneys often overlook the possibility of recovering them.  In Estate of Hass, the court sums up by saying.

[¶21] In Estate of Rohrich, 496 N.W.2d 566, 570 (N.D. 1993), this Court considered the issue of whether an attorney who is employed by a beneficiary for a will contest can recover attorney fees from the estate. This Court concluded there is no statutory basis for an award of attorney fees for legal services performed primarily for the personal interest of a beneficiary, but recognized the trial court may award attorney fees, as a matter of equity, for legal services benefiting the estate as a whole:

It has been held that the equitable power of a court authorizes an award of attorney fees in an action by one person which benefits a class of persons, thus making it equitable to spread the costs of the action among the members of the benefited class. More specifically, some states allow beneficiaries to recover fees in equity when, at their own expense and not for their sole benefit, their attorney's services benefited the estate as a whole by increasing a common fund in which other beneficiaries might share.

The case of  T.F. James Co. v. Vakoch, 2001 ND 112, 628 N.W.2d 298  is one in which the ND appellate court had to give some strict instructions to the trial court on the usual way the ND Supreme Court wants an award of attorney's fee to be calculated.  The result is that this case [T.F. James Co. v. Vakoch, 2001 ND 112, 628 N.W.2d 298 -- the second appeal in the case] will probably be the standard which trial courts will use in most cases in that state.  The case specified that the court should look at the reasonable number of hours expended and multiply that times the "lodestar" rate per hour.  The "lodestar" rate for the case was described as follows.

[¶23] To guide the district court in determining the reasonableness of the fees it shall award, we identify the factors in N.D.R.Prof. Conduct 1.5(a):

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

This Court has uniformly held that when determining the reasonableness of attorney fees, all factors must be considered and no single factor controls. In determining fees on remand, the district court shall first decide the number of hours reasonably expended, and then determine a reasonable hourly rate. See City of Medora v. Golberg, 1997 ND 190, ¶¶ 19-22, 569 N.W.2d 257 (applying the "lodestar" method rather than proportionality of fees to the verdict); see also City of Bismarck v. Thom, 261 N.W.2d 640, 646 (N.D. 1977) (identifying the manner of calculation, identifying total hours and rate per hour as "predominate," and stating evidence and specific findings are necessary); and Hughes v. North Dakota Crime Victims Reparations Bd., 246 N.W.2d 774, 777 (N.D. 1976) (identifying "the undesirability of the case" and "awards in similar cases"). After this analysis, the fees shall not be reduced based on any other factor.

This T.F. James case is also noteworthy for its discussion of when the parties can contract for attorneys fees to be paid by a losing party to litigation.